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a b s t r a c t
We give a reduction from any two-player game to a special case of the Leontief exchange
economy, with the property that the Nash equilibria of the game and the equilibria of the
market are in one-to-one correspondence.
Our reduction exposes a computational hurdle inherent in solving certain families of
market equilibrium problems: finding an equilibrium for Leontief economies is at least as
hard as finding a Nash equilibrium for two-player nonzero sum games, a problem recently
proven to be PPAD-complete.
As a corollary of the one-to-one correspondence, we obtain a number of hardness
results for questions related to the computation of market equilibria, using results already
established for games [I. Gilboa, E. Zemel, Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity
considerations, Games and Economic Behavior 1 (1989) 80–93]. In particular, among
other results, we show that it is NP-hard to say whether a particular family of Leontief
exchange economies, that is guaranteed to have at least one equilibrium, has more than
one equilibrium.
Perhaps more importantly, we also prove that it is NP-hard to decide whether a
Leontief exchange economy has an equilibrium. This fact should be contrasted against
the known PPAD-completeness result of [C.H. Papadimitriou, On the complexity of the
parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence, Journal of Computer and System
Sciences 48 (1994) 498–532], which holds when the problem satisfies some standard
sufficient conditions that make it equivalent to the computational version of Brouwer’s
Fixed Point Theorem.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In a strategic game, each player takes decisionswhich depend on the strategies available to the other players. The exchange
economy setting differs from the scenario of games, because the equilibrium prices have the ‘‘decentralizing’’ effect of
making the strategic decisions of the economic agents independent. However there is a natural interplay betweenWalrasian
equilibria for exchange economies and Nash equilibria for games: one of the very first proofs of existence of an economic
equilibrium is built upon the existence of a Nash equilibrium in an associated abstract game. The actors in this game are the
economic agents and an extra player, the market, whose strategy set coincides with the prices.
I A preliminary version of this paper has been presented at SODA 2006, under the title ‘‘Leontief Economies Encode Nonzero Sum Two-Player Games’’.∗ Corresponding author.
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In this paper we first establish a one-to-one correspondence between the Nash equilibria in any two-player nonzero sum
game and theWalrasian equilibria in an associated exchange economy. We then use this correspondence to state a number
of hardness results for economies.
Bimatrix games
We consider two-player games in normal form, also known as bimatrix games. These games can in fact be described by a
pair (A, B) of matrices, whose entries represent the payoffs of the two players, called row and column player. A = (aij) (resp.
B = (bij)) is the payoff matrix of the row (resp. column) player.
The rows (resp. columns) of A and B are indexed by the row (resp. column) player’s pure strategies.
The entry aij is the payoff to the row player, when she plays her i-th pure strategy and the opponent plays his j-th pure
strategy. Similarly, bij is the payoff to the column player, when he plays his j-th pure strategy and the opponent plays her
i-th pure strategy.
Amixed strategy is a probability distribution over the set of pure strategies. In a mixed strategy a player associates to her
i-th pure strategy a quantity pi between 0 and 1, such that
∑
i pi = 1, where the sum ranges over all the pure strategies.
Let us consider the game (A, B), where A and B arem× nmatrices. In such a game the row player hasm pure strategies,
while the column player has n pure strategies. Let x (resp. y) be a mixed strategy of the row (resp. column) player. Strategy
x is the m-tuple x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm), where xi ≥ 0, and∑mi=1 xi = 1. Similarly, y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn), where yi ≥ 0, and∑n
i=1 yi = 1.
When the pair of mixed strategies x and y is played, the entry aij contributes to the expected payoff of the row player
with weight xiyj. The expected payoff of the row player can be evaluated by adding up all the entries of A weighted by the
corresponding entries of x and y, i.e.
∑
ij xiyjaij. This can be rewritten as
∑
i xi
∑
j aijyj, which can be expressed in matrix
terms as1xTAy. Similarly, the expected payoff of the column player is xTBy.
A pair of mixed strategies (x, y) is in Nash equilibrium if xTAy ≥ x′TAy, for all stochastic m-vectors x′, and xTBy ≥ xTBy′,
for all stochastic n-vectors y′.
We say that x (resp. y) is a Nash equilibrium strategy for the row (resp. column) player.
The set of indices such that xi > 0 (resp. yi > 0) is called the support of the Nash equilibrium strategy x (resp. y).
Exchange economies
We now describe the model of an exchange economy, and define the appropriate notion of equilibrium.
Let us consider m economic agents interested in trading n goods. Let Rn+ denote the subset of R
n with all nonnegative
coordinates. The j-th coordinate in Rn will stand for good j. Each trader i has a concave utility function ui : Rn+ → R+, which
represents her preferences for the different bundles of goods, and an initial endowment of goodswi = (wi1, . . . , win) ∈ Rn+.
At given prices pi ∈ Rn+, trader i will sell her endowment, and get the bundle of goods xi = (xi1, . . . , xin) ∈ Rn+ which
maximizes ui(x) subject to the budget constraint2 pi · x ≤ pi · wi.
An equilibrium for an exchange economy is a vector of prices pi = (pi1, . . . , pin) ∈ Rn+ at which, for each trader i, there is
a bundle x¯i = (x¯i1, . . . , x¯in) ∈ Rn+ of goods such that the following two conditions hold:
1. For each trader i, the vector x¯i maximizes ui(x) subject to the constraints pi · x ≤ pi · wi and x ∈ Rn+.
2. For each good j,
∑
i x¯ij ≤
∑
iwij.
For any price vector pi , the vector xi(pi) that maximizes ui(x) subject to the constraints pi · x ≤ pi ·wi and x ∈ Rn+ is called
the demand of trader i at prices pi .
Then Xk(pi) = ∑i xik(pi) denotes the market demand of good k at prices pi , and Zk(pi) = Xk(pi) −∑iwik the market
excess demand of good k at prices pi . The vectors X(pi) = (X1(pi), . . . , Xn(pi)) and Z(pi) = (Z1(pi), . . . , Zn(pi)) are called
market demand (or aggregate demand) andmarket excess demand, respectively.
We say that the market satisfiesWalras’ Law if for any price pi , we have pi · Z(pi) = 0.
When themarket is described in terms of the aggregate excess demand function, the equilibrium conditions are satisfied
by a vector of prices pi = (pi1, . . . , pin) ∈ Rn+ such that Z(pi) is well-defined and Z j(pi) ≤ 0, for each j.
The requirement that Z(pi) is well defined means that, for each trader i, there is a vector x¯i ∈ Rn+ such that pi · x¯i ≤ pi ·wi
and ui(x) ≤ ui(x¯i) for every x ∈ Rn+ such that pi · x ≤ pi · wi. In other words, each trader has an optimal bundle among her
feasible bundles.
Sometimes, one assumes that the traders maximize some special utility functions. Typical examples are linear, Cobb–
Douglas, Leontief, and CES functions.
A linear utility function has the form ui(x) =∑j aijxij. The Cobb–Douglas function has the form ui(x) =∏j(xij)aij , where∑
j aij = 1. The Leontief function has the form ui(x) = minj aijxij. A CES (constant elasticity of substitution) utility function
1We use the notation xT to denote the transpose of vector x.
2 Given two vectors x and y, x · y denotes their inner product.
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has the form u(xi) = (∑j(aijxij)ρ)1/ρ , where −∞ < ρ < 1 but ρ 6= 0. (aij ≥ 0 in all these definitions). As ρ tends to 1
(resp. 0,−∞), the CES function tends to a linear (resp. Cobb–Douglas, Leontief) function ([1], page 231).
Total search problems and the class PPAD
The context of computation of equilibria calls for a complexity analysis conducted within the class TFNP of total search
problems, i.e. problems whose set of solutions is guaranteed to be non empty. Nash Theorem [27] guarantees that the
problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game in normal form is a total search problem. Arrow and
Debreu Theorem [2] gives sufficient conditions under which an exchange economy has an equilibrium. Therefore, under
suitable sufficient conditions, the problem of finding a market equilibrium is a total search problem.
However, in general, given an economy expressed in terms of traders’ utility functions and initial endowments, an
equilibrium does not need to exist. For instance, for economies where the traders have linear utility functions, Gale [15]
determined necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium. Codenotti et al. proved similar results for
CES functions [8]. Therefore, unlikewhat happenswith strategic games, the complexity of equilibria for exchange economies
falls into the framework of the class TFNP only under suitable assumptions. This fact will play a role in some of our results.
An important subclass of TFNP is the class PPAD, which is the class of total functions whose totality is proven by the
following simple combinatorial argument: if a directed graph whose nodes have in-degree and out-degree at most one has
a source, it must have a sink. This class was introduced by Papadimitriou [29]. It captures a wealth of equilibrium problems,
e.g., the market equilibrium problem as well as Nash equilibria for n-player games. Problems complete for this class include
a (suitably defined) computational version of the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem.
The computational complexity of computing aNash equilibrium for two-player nonzero sumgameshave been the subject
of recent investigations. Contrary to previous conjectures, the problem has been proven PPAD-complete by Chen and Deng
[4]. Chen and Deng’s result came after a sequence of works, where first the PPAD-completeness of 4-player games [9,19],
and then of 3-player games [3,10] were proven. Therefore the correspondence proven in this paper shows that the problem
of computing a market equilibrium, when confined to the restrictive scenario of a special family of Leontief economies, is
PPAD-complete.
The game-market correspondence
We consider exchange economieswhere `, the number of traders, is equal to the number of goods, and the i-th trader has
an initial endowment given by one unit of the i-th good. The traders have a Leontief (or fixed-proportion) utility function,
which describes their goal of getting a bundle of goods in proportions determined by ` given parameters.
Given an arbitrary bimatrix game, specified by a pair of n × m matrices A and B, with positive entries, we construct a
Leontief exchange economy with n+m traders and n+m goods as follows.
Trader i has an initial endowment consisting of one unit of good i, for i = 1, . . . , n + m. Traders indexed by any
j ∈ {1, . . . , n} receive some utility only from goods k ∈ {n + 1, . . . , n + m}, and this utility is specified by parameters
corresponding to the entries of the matrix B. More precisely, the proportions in which the j-th trader wants the goods are
specified by the entries on the j-th row of B. Viceversa, traders indexed by any k ∈ {n+ 1, . . . , n+ m} receive some utility
only from goods j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. In this case, the proportions in which the k-th trader wants the goods are specified by the
entries on the k-th column of A.
In the economy above, we can partition the traders in two groups, which bring to the market disjoint sets of goods, and
are only interested in the goods brought by the group they do not belong to.
We show that the Nash equilibria of any bimatrix game (A, B) are in one-to-one correspondence with the market
equilibria of such an economy.
Applications: NP-hardness results
This one-to-one correspondence allows us to import the results of Gilboa and Zemel [18] on the NP-hardness of some
computational problems connected with Nash equilibria, and show, among other results, that saying whether there is
more than one equilibrium in an exchange economy is NP-hard. The latter problem is relevant for applied work, where
the uniqueness question is of fundamental importance.
We then prove that saying whether a Leontief exchange economy has an equilibrium is NP-hard. More precisely, we
construct an economywhere the traders have Leontief utility functions, and such that saying whether an equilibrium exists
isNP-hard. Once again, note that this result does not contradictwhat is shown in [29],where themarket equilibriumproblem
(both in the versionwhere the input is expressed in terms of utilities and endowments, and in that in terms of excess demand
functions) is put in the class PPAD. Indeed such a result assumes standard sufficient conditions which guarantee existence
by either Kakutani’s or Brouwer’s fixed point theorem [2].
Relation to other work
An important recent advance in computational complexity shows that finding a Nash equilibrium for nonzero sum
bimatrix games is complete for the class PPAD [4].
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The correspondence established in this paper implies that any algorithm which computes a Nash equilibrium for a
bimatrix game computes a market equilibrium for a special Leontief economy, and, viceversa, any algorithm for the market
equilibrium with Leontief utility functions must have the ability to compute a Nash equilibrium for a bimatrix game.
Therefore themarket equilibrium problem is hard for the class PPAD, evenwhen restricted to a special Leontief exchange
economy. 3
This fact significantly enhances the current understanding of the problem of computing market equilibria, and clarifies
the extent to which there is room for efficient algorithms.
Polynomial time algorithms (or approximation schemes) are only known for markets whose demand function satisfies
suitable conditions which guarantee that the set of equilibria is convex [5–7,11,16,17,22,23,28,31].
Roughly speaking, these results take advantage, explicitly or implicitly, of settings where the market’s reaction to price
changes is well-behaved either because the market demand retains some properties of the individual demands or thanks
to the special structure of the individual utility functions (e.g., linear, Cobb–Douglas, CES in a certain range of its defining
parameter, the elasticity of substitution).
In contrast, exchange economieswith CES utility functions outside the range studied in [8], i.e. for ρ < −1, admitmultiple
disconnected equilibria [20], and no efficient algorithm is known to handle this setting.
A Leontief utility function describes the behavior of an extreme CES consumer, i.e., ρ →−∞.
Note that CES utility functionswith ρ << −1 can approximate Leontief functions, so that efficient algorithms formarket
equilibria with CES consumers might have implications on the approximability of Nash equilibria for bimatrix games.
Note that the expressive power of Leontief economies is strongly reduced whenever the income of the traders is
independent of the prices. Indeed, in such a case, Leontief economies become subject to the aggregation result by Eisenberg
[14], and thus an equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time [7].
Finally, our hardness result concerning the existence of an equilibrium in a Leontief exchange economy should be
contrasted against the already mentioned characterizations of [8,15] for linear and CES utility functions. These necessary
and sufficient conditions boil down to the bi-connectivity of a directed graph, which can be verified in polynomial time.
Organization of this paper
In Section 2we defineNash equilibria for bimatrix games as a linear complementarity problem, and specialize the notions
of equilibria (and quasi-equilibria) for the Leontief economies studied in this paper. In Section 3 we reduce an arbitrary
bimatrix game to a special Leontief economy, thus establishing a one-to-one correspondence between the Nash equilibria
of the game and the equilibria of the economy.
In Section 4we first use the one-to-one correspondence stated in Section 3 to import the hardness results of [18] for Nash
equilibria in bimatrix games, and get corresponding hardness results for the market equilibrium problem. We then use one
of these hardness results to prove that it is NP-hard to decide whether a Leontief exchange economy has an equilibrium.
In Section 5 we describe a partial converse of the previous results, by reducing the Leontief economies studied in [32] to
bimatrix games.
In Section 6 we mention some related work, and suggest some open questions.
2. Games, Markets, and LCP
Let us consider the problem of computing the Nash equilibria for any bimatrix game (A, B), where A and B are m × n
matrices, which we assume to be strictly positive without loss of generality.
Recall that a pair of mixed strategies (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium if xTAy ≥ x′TAy, for all stochastic m-vectors x′, and
xTBy ≥ xTBy′, for all stochastic n-vectors y′.
Note that xTAy ≥ x′TAy implies that xTAy ≥ ∑j aijyj, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, and, similarly, xTBy ≥ xTBy′ implies that
xTBy ≥∑i bijxi, j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Since A and B are strictly positive, we have that xTAy and xTBy are strictly positive. We can thus introduce the vectors u
and v, whose i-th entries are ui = yixTAy , and vi = xixTBy , respectively.
In terms of u and v, the inequalities above become∑
i
bijvi ≤ 1 ∀j∑
j
aijuj ≤ 1 ∀i.
3 After a preliminary version of this paper was published in SODA 2006, Huang and Teng showed that the game-market correspondence can be extended
to the approximate setting, and can be used to prove hardness results for the approximation of the market equilibrium [21]
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If we now add two vectors of slack variables, r and t , we can transform these inequalities into equalities, i.e.,{
BTv + t = 1, t ≥ 0
Au+ r = 1, r ≥ 0,
where 1 denotes the vectors (of appropriate sizes) whose components are all equal to 1.
We now have to add the constraint that characterizes the support of a Nash equilibrium in terms of best responses.
In other words, we must express the fact that a pure strategy is played with positive probability if and only if it is a best
response. Such property can be written as
xi > 0 →
∑
j
aijyj = xTAy
yi > 0 →
∑
j
bjixj = xTBy.
These conditions translate into the complementary constraints r · v = t · u = 0.
Putting everything together, we can express the Nash equilibrium conditions as the following linear complementarity
problem, which we call LCP1.
LCP1: Find a nonnegativew 6= 0 and a nonnegative z such that
Hw + z = 1
wTz = 0,
where
H =
(
0 A
BT 0
)
∈ R(n+m)×(n+m).
Note that the system LCP1 may be equivalently viewed as the problem of finding a nonnegative vector 0 6= w ∈ Rn+m such
that ∑
j
hijwj ≤ 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n+m,
and
wi > 0→
∑
j
hijwj = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n+m,
where hij denotes the (i, j)-th entry of the matrix H .
From Nash Theorem on the existence of a Nash equilibrium [27], it follows that LCP1 has at least one solution w. Let
N = {j : j ≤ n} andM = {j : n < j ≤ n+m}. It is easy to see thatwj > 0 for some action j ∈ N as well as for some action
j ∈M, since each of the players is playing a mixed strategy. In other words, ifwi > 0 and i ∈ N , then there must be at least
one j ∈M such thatwj > 0; otherwise,
1 =
∑
j
hijwj =
n+m∑
j=n+1
hijwj = 0
which is a contradiction. Similarly,wi > 0 and i ∈M imply that there must be at least one j ∈ N such thatwj > 0.
We now describe a special form of a Leontief exchange economy, the pairing model [32], in which there are ` traders and
` goods. The economy is described by a square matrix F of size `. The j-th trader has an initial endowment consisting of one
unit of the j-th good, and has a Leontief utility function
uj(x) = min
i:fij 6=0
{
xi
fij
}
.
An equilibrium for such an economy is given by a nonnegative price vector 0 6= pi ∈ R` such that
1. For each 1 ≤ j ≤ `, βj = pij∑
k fkjpik
is well-defined, that is,
∑
k fkjpik > 0.
2. For each good 1 ≤ i ≤ `,∑j fijβj ≤ 1; that is, the total trading volume does not exceed the quantity available.
Note that βj represents the utility value of the optimal bundle of the trader j at equilibrium, and the optimal bundle itself
is (f1jβj, . . . , f`jβj). Standard arguments imply that if pii > 0, then in fact
∑
j fijβj = 1. Moreover, we also have that pij > 0 if
and only if βj > 0.
A closely related notion is that of a quasi-equilibrium. In our setting, a quasi-equilibrium is obtained by replacing condition
(1) above by
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1′. For each 1 ≤ j ≤ `, there exists βj such that βj(∑k fkjpik) = pij.
In a quasi-equilibrium, the zero-bundle, corresponding to βj = 0, is a valid bundle when pij = 0, even though∑k fkjpik = 0.
Thus the main difference between an equilibrium and a quasi-equilibrium is that in the latter, a trader with zero income
is not required to optimize her utility. The reader is referred to the textbook of Mas-Colell et al. [25] for a more systematic
development. One standard way to establish sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium is to first use fixed
point theorems to establish the existence of a quasi-equilibrium, and then argue that under the sufficient conditions, every
quasi-equilibrium is an equilibrium.
A simple example of a (pairing) Leontief economy that has a quasi-equilibrium but no equilibrium is encoded by the
matrix
F =
(1 1 0
0 1 2
0 0 1
)
.
Indeed it is easy to check thatpi = (0, 1, 0) is a quasi-equilibrium.On the other hand, condition (1) above for the existence
of an equilibrium cannot be satisfied.
3. Leontief economies encode bimatrix games
We give a polynomial time computable reduction from any two-player nonzero sum game to the Leontief exchange
economies constructed above with the property that the Nash equilibria of the game and the equilibria of the market are in
one-to-one correspondence. This shows that the problem of computing Nash equilibria for a bimatrix game is equivalent to
that of computing market equilibria for these exchange economies. To prove this result, we follow the approach of Ye [32].
Given an instance of the problem of computing the Nash equilibria for a bimatrix game (A, B), where A and B are positive
n× mmatrices, we construct an instance of a (pairing) exchange economy with (n+ m) traders and (n+ m) goods that is
given by setting F = H . It is also easy to see that trading needs to occur between some trader j ∈ N and some trader j ∈M,
since traders in N are only interested in goods that are brought in by traders inM, and viceversa. We call this economy
two-groups Leontief economy. It easily follows from the definition that at any equilibrium pi of the economy, we must have
pii > 0 for some i ∈ N as well as for some i ∈M.
From the market to the game
We first prove that any market equilibrium of the two-groups Leontief economy corresponds to a Nash equilibrium in
the associated two-player bimatrix game.
Lemma 1. Letβ = (β1, . . . , βn+m) be the vector of the utility values at equilibriumpricespi for the two-groups Leontief economy.
Then β solves LCP1, and thus it encodes the Nash equilibria of the game described by LCP1.
Proof. At any equilibrium of the market, we have
∑
j hijβj ≤ 1 for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n + m, and βj > 0 if and only if pij > 0.
Moreover, βi > 0→∑j hijβj = 1. Thus the β ’s from the equilibrium solve the system LCP1 withw = β . Moreover, pij, and
thus βj, is positive for some j, so thatw = β 6= 0.
From the game to the market
We now show that any Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game corresponds to a market equilibrium of the corresponding
two-groups Leontief economy.
Lemma 2. Let w 6= 0, be any solution to LCP1. Then there exists an equilibrium price vector pi such that w = (w1, . . . , wn+m)
is the vector of the utility values at these equilibrium prices for the two-groups Leontief economy.
Proof. Let w 6= 0 be any complementarity solution to LCP1. Partition the index set {1, . . . , n + m} into two sets P = {j :
wj > 0} and Z = {j : wj = 0}. As we showed before, P ∩N 6= ∅ and P ∩M 6= ∅.
We claim that there exists pij > 0 for each j ∈ P such thatwj = pij∑
k∈P hkjpik
, or in a different form,
∑
k∈P hkjwjpik = pij. Let
HPP be the |P|×|P| principal submatrix ofH induced by the indices in P , andWP the |P|×|P| diagonalmatrixwhose diagonal
contains the w’s corresponding to P . Our claim is equivalent to saying that the system Cσ = σ , where C = (HPPWP)T,
has a solution in which all the entries of σ are positive. Note that each column of C sums to one: this follows because
i ∈ P → wi > 0 and
wi > 0→
∑
j∈P
hijwj =
∑
j
hijwj = 1.
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Moreover,
C =
(
0 D
ET 0
)
,
where E and D are (|P| − l)× lmatrices, for some 1 ≤ l ≤ |P| − 1. The bounds on l follow from the fact that P ∩N 6= ∅ and
P ∩M 6= ∅.
The existence of such a positive solution to Cσ = σ follows from Proposition 3 below.
We have established our claim that there exists pij > 0 for each j ∈ P such that
wj = pij∑
k∈P
hkjpik
.
Set pij = 0 for j ∈ Z . We now argue that pi is an equilibrium.
Note that for j ∈ P , we have
wj = pij∑
k∈P
hkjpik
= pij∑
k
hkjpik
.
For j ∈ Z , observe that∑k hkjpik > 0. This is because there exists k ∈ P such that hkj > 0, since P contains elements from
bothN andM. For this k, we have hkjpik > 0. Therefore,
wj = pij∑
k∈P
hkjpik
= pij∑
k
hkjpik
= 0.
Moreover, we have, for each good 1 ≤ i ≤ n + m,∑j hijwj ≤ 1, since w is a solution of LCP1. Thus both the conditions
for an equilibrium are fulfilled, with thewi’s playing the role of the βi’s.
Proposition 3. The linear system Cσ = σ has a positive solution.
Proof. Consider the matrix
C2 =
(
DET 0
0 ETD
)
.
Notice that both DET and ETD are column stochastic, because C and hence D and ET are column stochastic. This fact,
together with the positivity of both DET and ETD, implies that the system C2z = z has a positive solution.
We can now write (C2 − I)z = 0 as (C − I)(C + I)z = 0. Consider the vector σ = (C + I)z. Clearly σ has all positive
components, if z has. Also (C − I)σ = 0 or Cσ = σ .
Note that Proposition 3 implies that C is irreducible besides column-stochastic, so that σ is in fact the unique Perron–
Frobenius eigenvector of C (see, for example, [24], p. 141). Consequently, we observe that there is precisely one equilibrium
price vector pi , the one we have constructed above, that corresponds to the utility vector w. This follows because we must
have pij > 0 if and only if wj > 0. Thus pij = 0 for j ∈ Z , pij > 0 for j ∈ P , and thus the unique positive solution of Cσ = σ
gives the only possible values for the prices for goods in P . From the definition, it follows that there is a unique utility vector
corresponding to an equilibrium price vector.
The following theorem summarizes the results of this section.
Theorem 4. Let (A, B) denote an arbitrary bimatrix game, where we assume, w.l.o.g., that the entries of the matrices A and B are
all positive. Let the columns of
H =
(
0 A
BT 0
)
describe the utility parameters of the traders in a two-groups Leontief economy. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the
Nash equilibria of the game (A, B) and themarket equilibria of the two-groups Leontief economy. Furthermore, the correspondence
has the property that a strategy is played with positive probability at a Nash equilibrium if and only if the good held by the
corresponding trader has a positive price at the corresponding market equilibrium.
Corollary 5. The problem of finding an equilibrium for a two-groups Leontief economy is PPAD-complete.
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4. Hardness results
Well known sufficient conditions guarantee that an equilibrium for an exchange economy does exist (see, e.g., [25]
Section 17C). Under such assumptions, its equivalence to fixed point problems follows from the combination of two results:
a simple transformation introduced by Uzawa [30], which maps any continuous function into an excess demand function,
inducing a one-to-one correspondence between the fixed points of the function and the equilibria, and the Sonnenschein-
Mantel-Debreu Theorem (see [25], pp. 598-606) which states the essentially arbitrary nature of the market excess demand
function.
Theorem 4 shows that there is a one-to-one correspondence between two-groups Leontief economies and bimatrix
games. Combining this theorem with the NP-hardness results of Giboa and Zemel for some questions related to Nash
equilibria [18], we show hardness results for Leontief economies.
One of these hardness results pertains the existence of an equilibrium where the prices of some prescribed goods are
positive. This specific hardness result allows us to construct a Leontief exchange economy for which an equilibrium exists
if and only if in another Leontief economy there is an equilibrium where the prices of some prescribed goods are positive.
This correspondence proves that it is NP-hard to test for existence.
Note that in general the equilibria of Leontief exchange economies can be irrational ([7], Section 3) so that the existential
problem might not belong to NP , and we thus talk of NP-hardness as opposed to NP-completeness.
4.1. Uniqueness and equilibria with additional properties
Gilboa and Zemel [18] proved a number of hardness results related to the computation of Nash equilibria (NE) for finite
games in normal form. Since the NE for games with more than two players can be irrational, these results have been
formulated in terms of NP-hardness for multi-player games, while they can be expressed in terms of NP-completeness
for two-player games.
Given a two-player game G in normal form, i.e. expressed as a bimatrix game, consider the following problems:
1. NE uniqueness: Given G, does there exist a unique NE in G?
2. NE in a subset: Given G, and a subset of strategies Ti for each player i, is there a NE where all the strategies outside Ti are
played with probability zero?
3. NE containing a subset: Given G, and a subset of strategies Ti for each player i, is there a NE where all the strategies in Ti
are played with positive probability?
4. NEmaximal support: GivenG and an integer r ≥ 1, does there exist a NE inG such that each player uses at least r strategies
with positive probability?
5. NEminimal support: GivenG and an integer r ≥ 1, does there exist a NE inG such that each player uses atmost r strategies
with positive probability?
Gilboa and Zemel showed that
1. NE uniqueness is co-NP complete;
2. NE in a subset, NE containing a subset, NE maximal support, and NE minimal support are NP-complete.
Combining the above results with Theorem 4, we get the following theorem.
Theorem 6. Given an exchange economy, where each trader is specified by an initial endowment and a Leontief utility function,
such that the economy has at least one equilibrium, the following problems are NP-hard:
1. Is there more than one equilibrium?
2. Is there an equilibrium where the prices of a given set of goods are positive?
Proof. The results use the reduction of Theorem 4, which, together with Nash Theorem on the existence of a Nash
equilibrium, tells us that the Leontief economy constructed by the reduction always has an equilibrium.
1. The NP-hardness follows from the coNP-completeness of NE uniqueness, and from the one-to-one correspondence of
Theorem 4. We also note that the construction of Gilboa and Zemel [18] for NE uniqueness yields games with a finite
number of equilibria.
2. The NP-hardness follows from the NP-completeness of NE containing a subset, and from Theorem 4.
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4.2. Existence of an equilibrium
We now give a reduction from statement (2) of Theorem 6 to show that the problem of deciding whether a Leontief
exchange economy has an equilibrium is NP-hard.
Theorem 7. It is NP-hard to decide whether a Leontief exchange economy has an equilibrium.
Proof. The reduction is from Theorem 6 (2). SupposeM is an instance of an economywith n traders and goods, andwewant
to know if there is an equilibrium with goods 1, . . . , k priced positively. We construct an economy M ′ with k additional
traders and goods: for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, the (n+ j)-th trader brings in one unit of the (n+ j)-th good and wants just the j-th good.
We argue thatM ′ has an equilibrium if and only ifM has an equilibrium with goods 1, . . . , k priced positively.
SupposeM has an equilibrium inwhich goods 1, . . . , k are priced positively. Then this can be extended to an equilibrium
ofM ′ by setting the prices of goods n+ 1, . . . , n+ k to be 0, and giving the (n+ j)-th trader 0 utility (and 0 units of good j).
It is evident that condition (1) for an equilibrium holds for the (n + j)-th trader, since the j-th good is priced positively.
Condition (2) also holds.
Consider now an equilibrium forM ′. For 1 ≤ j ≤ k, it can be seen fromWalras’ Law that the price of the (n+ j)-th good
must be zero, since nobody wants this good. For condition (1) to hold for the (n+ j)-th trader, it must be that the j-th good
is priced positively. It follows that the prices of the first n goods, together with the optimal bundles of the first n traders,
constitutes an equilibrium for the original economyM in which the prices of goods 1, . . . , k are positive.
We have proved thatM ′ has an equilibrium if and only ifM has an equilibrium with goods 1, . . . , k priced positively.M ′
can clearly be constructed fromM in polynomial time.
Notice that the reduction can be easily modified, if needed, to ensure that each good inM ′ is desired by some trader. (We
simply make the (n+ j)-th trader want both the (n+ j)-th good and the j-th good in the ratio 1:2.)
5. Bimatrix games encode the (pairing) Leontief economy
In this section, we establish a partial converse of the result of Section 3. We will show that bimatrix games encode a
special case of the pairing Leontief economies. In this setting, there are n traders and n goods. The j-th trader has an initial
endowment given by one unit of the j-th good, and has a Leontief utility function
uj(x) = min
i
{
xi
aij
}
,
where aij > 0, for all i, j.
We will show that finding equilibrium prices for the economy above is equivalent to finding equilibria for the bimatrix
game (A, I), where I denotes the identity matrix.
Consider the following linear complementarity problem, which we call LCP(A): Findw 6= 0 such that
Aw ≤ 1
wi > 0 → (Aw)i = 1
w ≥ 0.
Theorem 8. Let y be a nonnegative and nonzero n-vector. Let x be the n-vector such that xi = 1 if yi > 0, and xi = 0 if yi = 0.
Let x˜ = αx, with α = 1x1+···+xn , and y˜ = βy, with β = 1y1+···+yn . The vector y is a solution to LCP(A) if and only if (x˜, y˜) is a Nash
equilibrium for the bimatrix game (A, I).
Proof. The linear complementarity formulation for the Nash equilibria of the game (A, I) (see Section 2) consists of finding
nonnegative, and not both zero, solutions z andw to the system
Az ≤ 1
w ≤ 1
wi > 0→ (Az)i = 1
zi > 0→ wi = 1,
which we call LCP(A,I).
Since zi > 0 if and only ifwi > 0, we can conclude that if (z, w) solves LCP(A,I), then z solves LCP(A).
Conversely, it is easy to see that, if a vector z solves LCP(A), then the pair of vectors (z, w), wherew be the n-vector such
thatwi = 1 if zi > 0, andwi = 0 if zi = 0, solve LCP(A,I).
We now argue that any nonzero solution to the complementarity problem LCP(A), or equivalently any Nash equilibrium
of the game (A, I), corresponds to an equilibrium of the Leontief economy.
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Theorem 9. For any nonzero solution w of LCP(A) with a positive matrix A, there is an equilibrium price pi such that the utility
value of player i at pi iswi. Moreover, givenw, pi can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is implied by [32]. Let P = {j : wj > 0}, and Z = {j : wj = 0}. Then consider the stochastic
matrix APPD(wP), where APP is |P| × |P| principal submatrix of A induced by the indices in P , D(wP) is the diagonal matrix
whose entries arewj, j ∈ P . Since APPD(wP) > 0, it has a positive left eigenvector piP > 0. Let pij = 0 for j ∈ Z .
Since for some i,wi > 0, P is non-empty and therefore pi is also nonzero. Furthermore, it is very easy to see that:
1. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n,∑nj=1 aijwj ≤ 1
2. wi > 0→∑nj=1 aijwj = 1.
Therefore,w is an allocation supported by the equilibrium price vector pi .
It is straightforward to see that any equilibrium of the pairing Leontief economy yields a Nash equilibrium of the
game (A, I).
Note that McLennan and Tourky [26] have also shown that finding a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game is polynomial
time equivalent to finding a solution to an instance of LCP(A). Their approach provides an alternative way to derive the
equivalence results of this paper.
It is worthwhile to point out that, while the reduction in Theorem 4 is from arbitrary bimatrix games, the reduction in
this section is from only a special family of Leontief economies. As in bimatrix games, the equilibrium points of the pairing
Leontief economies are rational numbers [32]. However, in the case where the endowments of the buyers are unrestricted,
Eaves [12] gives an example showing that equilibrium points could be irrational. This suggests that there is no natural linear
complementarity formulation for general Leontief exchange economies.
Furthermore, we have assumed that the entries of the utility matrix A are positive. This restriction is necessary because
if some entries of A are zero, APP may be reducible and a strictly positive left eigenvector piP may not exist. This shows a
subtle difference in the structure of equilibria in these two settings despite their similar linear complementarity programs.
It is easy to see that adding a constant to all the entries of a matrix corresponding to a game does not change its equilibrium
points, but adding a constant to all entries of the utility matrix of a Leontief economy might change the set of equilibria.
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have introduced a correspondence between exchange economies and bimatrix games, and analyzed
some related computational consequences.
Prior to this work, Eaves has shown in [12] that the equilibrium in exchange economies with Cobb–Douglas utility
functions can be obtained as the solution to a special linear programming problem. Because of the well known equivalence
between zero-sum games and linear programming (due to Von Neumann Minimax Theorem), we have that Cobb–Douglas
exchange economies can be coded as special two-player zero-sum games, and thus can be reduced to the Leontief exchange
economies studied in this paper.
In another piece of work, Eaves [13] has shown that the equilibria for linear exchange economies can be obtained as
solutions to a linear complementarity problem. It would be interesting to see if this complementarity problem can be
expressed in the form of LCP1, where H is a nonnegative matrix. If so, the technique in Section 5 can be used to reduce
it to a bimatrix game, and hence to a Leontief exchange economy.
The reductions from linear or Cobb–Douglas economies to Leontief economies would be from ‘easy’ to ‘hard’ problems,
but they would nevertheless be an interesting exercise.
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